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RECOVERY IN TORT FOR EDUCATIONAL
MALPRACTICE: PROBLEMS OF THEORY
AND POLICY*
Robert H. Jerry, II**
Nearly a decade has passed since a few imaginative commentators suggested
that students could sue their teachers and schools in tort for inadequate classroom
instruction.' These early suggestions proved to be prophetic. During the last decade,
several students have initiated lawsuits against their schools and teachers to recover
money damages for "educational malpractice."2
Although these lawsuits have occurred only sporadically, the implications of
students suing their teachers and schools for "educational malpractice" are of great
interest to educators' and legal scholars.4 Given the substantial publicity afforded
malpractice suits against persons in other professions, it is not surprising that edu-
cators have bristled when confronted with the provocative notion that a student
might recover money damages for the loss of the difference the teacher or school
* This Article is adapted from the author's presentation at the Annual School Law Conference, Indiana
State University, Terre Haute, Indiana, on May 2, 1980. The author expresses his appreciation to Stephen
W. Lee for his useful comments and suggestions.
** Member of Indiana Bar. B.S. 1974, Indiana State University; J.D. 1977, University of Michigan.
'See You in Court, SATURDAY REV., Oct. 14, 1972, at 50; Suing the Schools for Fraud: Issues and
Legal Strategies (Mar. 1973) (transcript of a conference on Fraud in the Schools, Washington, D.C.)
(Fducational Policy Research Center, Syracuse University Research Corp., 1973).
'An action for educational malpractice seeks to recover for the loss of learning caused by inadequate
instruction. In other words, the action alleges that because of inadequate instruction the student was
prevented from learning as much as he would have learned. Immediately, one is confronted with the idea
that the cause of action for educational malpractice sounds in contract, rather than in tort. The claim for
educational malpractice appears to allege that the school promised to teach the student skills and to
develop the students to a certain level, but failed to fulfill its promise. The claim definitely has con-
tractual overtones, but the same can be said of any malpractice theory. For example, plaintiff in the
medical setting contends that the doctor promised to mend his hand but failed to do so, or that the doctor
promised to remove his tumor and improve his health, but the doctor did not perform as promised, and
he is not as healthy as he would have been but for the failure of the doctor to perform as promised.
That medical malpractice should be dealt with under contract law, rather than under tort law, is not a
new argument. See O'Connell, The Interlocking Death and Rebirth of Contract and Tort, 75 U. MICH.
L. REV. 659, 665-66 (1977) (discussing, but rejecting argument that contract theory in allocating loss in
medical malpractice is solution to tort law's deficiencies). Courts, however, generally continue to view
malpractice from a tort perspective. In the medical service setting the physician's liability is based on
negligence, unlike liability in contract. Plaintiff sues not so much for the loss of an expectancy, as for the
damage to his person-the loss of health that would not have occurred but for the physician's negligence.
Similarly, in the educational setting, the student alleges that the educator's negligence prevented him
from obtaining skills that he would have obtained but for the negligence. While the argument can be
transposed to sound in contract, its substantive basis is in tort.
'E.g., Hentoff, Who's to Blame? The Politics of Educational Malpractice, 6 LEARNING, Oct. 1977, at
40; Sharken, Dangers in Educational Malpractice Concept, As. TEACHER, June 1975, at 4; Sparks &
Strauss, How Soon Before Those "Professional" Teachers of Yours Can Be Stied for Malpractice?, 159 AM.
ScH. BOARD J., June 1972, at 19; Sugarman, Accountability Through the Courts, 82 ScH. REV. 233
(1974).
'Abel, Can a Student Sue the Schools for Educational Malpractice, 44 HARv. EDUc. REV. 416 (1974);
Elson, A Common Law Remedy for the Educational Harms Covered by Incompetent or Careless Teaching,
73 Nw. U.L. REV. 641 (1978); Rattner, Remedying Failure to Teach Basic Skills: Preliminary Thoughts,
17 INEQUALITY EDUC. 15 (1974); Vacca, Teacher Malpractice, 8 U. RICH. L. Rrv. 447 (1974); Note, The
ABC's of Duty: Educational Malpractice and the Ftnctionally Illiterate Student, 8 GOLDEN GATE U. L.
REV. 293 (1978); Note, Educational Malpractice: When Can Johnny Sie?, 7 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 117
(1978); Note, Nonliability for Negligence in the Public Schools-"Educational Malpractice" from Peter
W. to Hoffman, 55 NOTRE DAME LAW. 814 (1980); Note, Educational Malpractice: Can the Judiciary
Remedy the Growing Problem of Functional Illiteracy?, 13 SUiFOLK U.L. REV. 27 (1979); Note, Edu-
cational Malfeasance: A New Cause of Action for Failure to Educate?, 14 TULSA L.J. 383 (1978); Note,
Educational Malpractice, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 755 (1976); Note, Educational Malpractice, 1 W. NEW
ENGLAND L. REV. 759 (1979).
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system makes in how much the student learns. Beyond the practical concerns voiced
by educators, the suggestion that students have a cause of action for educational
malpractice has presented courts with difficult questions of theory and policy.5
This Article considers whether denial of a cause of action for educational mal-
practice is consistent with recognized tort principles and the general policy con-
siderations underlying those principles. After briefly summarizing three lawsuits
in which the cause of action has been advocated and rejected, it explores the
collision between theory and policy that permeates the decisions. The Article sug-
gests that refusal to recognize the cause of action is incompatible with accepted tort
principles, and that a cogent theory supporting nonrecognition cannot be articulated
within the confines of the accepted principles and the general policies upon which
those principles are based. If special policies justifying nonrecognition exist, then
that result should be legislatively prescribed, rather than judicially pronounced in a
manner that is antithetical to the recognized, traditional tort principles.
I. THE DECIDED CASES
Although several suits alleging educational malpractice by schools or teachers
were initiated in recent years,6 only three of those suits resulted in reported decisions.
Yet those three lawsuits-Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School District,'
Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School District,8 and Ho§man v. Board of Edu-
cationO -resulted in no less than seven published opinions.
A. Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School District
In Peter W., a student who had graduated from a high school operated by
defendant school district and who had attended the district's schools for twelve
years,'" charged the school district and other defendants" with a variety of negligent
acts and omissions.1  The gravamen of Peter W.'s complaint was that defendants
"negligently and carelessly failed to provide plaintiff with adequate instruction,
'The questions raised by the treatment of educational malpractice allegations might be said to be
threefold: (1) Are the holdings that no cause of action exists for educational malpractice consistent with
recognized tort principles and the general policy considerations upon which those principles are based?
(2) If not, is it the judiciary's function to declare, as a matter of policy, that no such cause of action exists,
or is this function more appropriately performed by legislatures? (3) Given a determination of which
decisionmaker can best decide whether educational malpractice should be actionable, what decision should
be made and, if the decision is to limit the cause of action, how should that decision be effected? Before
the last two questions can be addressed cogently, the answer to the first question must be clearly under-
stood.
'At least eight educational malpractice lawsuits have been filed. No effort is made to inventory or
discuss in detail the non-reported lawsuits. For further discussion, see Note, The ABC's of Duty:
Educational Malpractice and the Functionally Illiterate Student, 8 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REv. 293 (1978)
(Fisher); Note, Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School District: New York Chooses not to Recognize
"Educational Malpractice," 43 ALB. L. REv. 339 (1979) (Garrett, McNeil, and Beaman).
160 Cal. App. 3d 814, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1976).
'95 Misc. 2d 1, 408 N.Y.S.2d 584 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1977), afld, 64 A.D.2d 29, 407 N.Y.S.2d
874 (1978), afl'd, 47 N.Y.2d 440, 391 N.E.2d 1352, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1979).
-64 A.D.2d 369, 410 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1978), rev'd, 49 N.Y.2d 121, 400 N.E.2d 317, 424 N.Y.S.2d 376
(1979).
1060 Cal. App. 3d at 817, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 856.
n Plaintiff also sued the district superintendent, the school board, and the board members in their
individual capacities. Id. at 817, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 855.
"2 Plaintiff's complaint, as explained by the California Court of Appeal, stated seven counts. Count I
sounded in negligence. See id. at 817, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 856. Counts III through VII incorporated the
allegations of Count I and pleaded various breaches of a duty purported to arise out of statutory law.
See id. at 826, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 861-62. Count 1I also incorporated the allegations of Count I and
charged that the school district misrepresented plaintiff's performance, thereby causing his injury. Id. at
827, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 862.
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guidance, counseling or supervision in basic academic skills such as reading and
writing."" He postulated that defendants' relationship to him was akin to the
relationship that exists between any professional and the person benefitting from
the professional's services. He claimed that this relationship gave rise to a legally
cognizable duty, as it does in the context of other professional services. Specifically,
he claimed that defendants failed to exercise the "degree of professional skill re-
quired of an ordinary prudent educator under the same circumstances,"'14 a standard
parallel to that applied to other professionals."'
Peter W. contended that defendants "negligently and carelessly" breached the
duty they owed to him in five ways: (1) by failing to recognize his reading dis-
ability; (2) by assigning him to classes beyond his skill level, in which he could not
progress because he could not sufficiently comprehend the material; (3) by pro-
moting him to more advanced grades and courses before he achieved the skills
necessary to advance; (4) by providing instructors who were not qualified to teach
students with his kind of learning disabilities; and (5) by permitting him to
graduate even though his reading skills equalled those of the average fifth grade
student.' 6 Peter W. sought damages that would compensate him for his inability to
obtain meaningful employment because of skill deficiencies, his diminished earning
capacity, and the costs of the remedial tutoring he obtained.' 7
Defendants did not dispute the sufficiency of plaintiff's complaint in pleading
negligence, proximate cause, and injury.' They did, however, dispute whether the
complaint alleged facts sufficient to establish that defendants owed Peter W. a duty
of care.1"
The court, after rejecting plaintiff's bases for a duty of care,20 explained that the
scope of a duty is limited by the foreseeability of the injury2' and that judicial
recognition of the duty is initially determined by reference to considerations of
public policy.2 2 The court inventoried the often-listed factors relevant to the inquiry:
the social utility of and the risk involved in the conduct of the activity out of which
the injury arises; the status of the parties to the relationship; the feasibility of a
standard of care and the ability of the parties to translate the standard into practical
means of preventing injury; the foreseeability of injury resulting from violation of
the standard; the difficulty of proving that a party was injured, including the
possibility of feigned claims; the ability of the parties to absorb, spread, or insure
"Id. at 818, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 856.
1d.
15See, e.g., Loudon v. Scott, 58 Mont. 645 ...., 194 P. 488, 491 (1920).
5860 Cal. App. 3d at 818, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 856.
"Id. at 818, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 856-57.
"Ild. at 818, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 857.
"Id.
"Peter W. argued that by assuming the task of instructing students, defendants thereby acquired a
duty to exercise that function with reasonable care. The court rejected this argument on the ground that
the cases plaintiff cited were distinguishable. The cases applied a statute granting tort immunity to
public employees when performing a job-related function "assumed" in the exercise of their discretion. Id.
at 820, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 858.
Alternatively, Peter W. argued the existence of a "special relationship" between student and teacher
out of which the duty arose, citing decisions recognizing various rights or privileges of students. The
court rejected this argument because none of the cases plaintiff cited involved a question of whether school
authorities owed students a duty in the course of their academic instruction. Id. Finally, Peter W. argued
that a duty to exercise reasonable care in the instruction and supervision of students had been recognized
in California. The court rejected this argument because the cited decisions, in its view, only recognized
a duty to exercise reasonable care for the physical safety of students. Id. at 821, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 857.
"Id.
"Id. at 822, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 859.
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against the financial burden of injury; the law already applicable to the relationship
between the parties; the effect of recognition of a duty on the relationship, the
parties, and society; and moral considerations, including the blameworthiness of a
party who violates the standard.3
The court evaluated Peter W.'s claims in light of these factors and expressed
three reservations about educational malpractice suits. First, it questioned the
feasibility of a standard of care, noting that educators hold diverse views on how to
teach 4 Second, the court questioned plaintiff's ability to prove causal links between
their injuries and the acts or omissions of schools and teachers. Nor was it clear to
the court that plaintiffs could identify the effects of factors beyond the control of
schools and teachers that contribute to a student's learning deficiencies. 25 Finally,
the court expressed its concern about the adverse effect that recognizing the existence
of a duty of care might have on school systems. It feared the prospect of "countless"
claims, some feigned, which would place excessive burdens on the public treasury
as well as the schools.2 In the final accounting, the court refused to recognize any
duty owed by defendants to Peter W. and held that plaintiff's complaint failed to
state a cause of action.2 7
B. Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School District2 8
1. The Trial Court
Plaintiff's claims in Donohue were substantially similar to those in Peter W.
Donohue, like Peter W., contended that defendant school district and its agents
breached a duty owed to him because Donohue was permitted to graduate even
though he lacked basic reading and writing skills and had received failing grades in
several subjects.2 He alleged that it had been necessary for him to seek tutoring in
order to acquire the basic skills that he had not been taught in high school.3
Donohue specifically claimed that defendant had a duty not only to teach him, but
also to ascertain his learning ability through tests calculated to measure his compre-
hension and understanding of various subjects. 3 ' He alleged, much like Peter W.,
that defendant had failed to recognize his learning deficiencies, to provide adequate
personnel and facilities for necessary tests and evaluation, to teach him in a manner
that he could understand, and to supervise properly his academic training.3 2 For
2 1d. at 822-24, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 859-60 (quoting Raymond v. Paradise United School Dist., 218 Cal.
App. 2d 1, 8-9, 31 Cal. Rptr. 847, 851 (1963), and Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 112-13, 70
Cal. Rptr. 97, 100, 443 P.2d 561, 564 (1968)).2460 Cal. App. 3d at 824-25, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 860-61.
2ld.2
1See id. at 825, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
" In deciding Counts III through VII, the court reasoned that the statute upon which Peter W. sought
to base a duty was not designed as a safeguard against educational underachievement and as such could
not serve as the basis of a cause of action. Id. at 826-27, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 862. The misrepresentation
allegation in Count II was rejected because, for the same policy reasons outlined earlier in its opinion, no
cause of action existed for negligent misrepresentation. Because plaintiff did not allege reliance on any
misrepresentation, the court held that Count 11 did not state a cause of action. Id. at 827, 131 Cal. Rptr. at
863.
2 95 Misc. 2d 1, 408 N.Y.S.2d 584 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1977), afl'd, 64 A.D.2d 29, 407 N.Y.S.2d
874 (1978), afl'd, 47 N.Y.2d 440, 391 N.E.2d 1352, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1979).
'See 64 A.D.2d at . 407 N.Y.S.2d at 876. Plaintiff further alleged that he did not have an under-
standing of the other subjects covered in his high school courses. Id.
' ld. at . 407 N.Y.S.2d at 876.
I d. at . 407 N.Y.S.2d at 876.
'id. at . 407 N.Y.S.2d at 876-77. Donohue also alleged in a second count that he was the third-
party beneficiary of a duty to educate imposed by the New York State Constitution. Id. at 407
N.Y.S.2d at 877.
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these alleged breaches, Donohue sought damages in the amount of five million
dollars.33
The trial court cited the "parallel if not identical" complaint and disposition in
Peter W. and held that Donohue's claim failed to state a cause of action for edu-
cational malpractice.34 The trial court, however, invited the Appellate Division of
the New York Supreme Court to review its decision. The Appellate Division
accepted this invitation and affirmed the dismissal in another published opinion.3 5
2. The New York Appellate Division
After articulating the factors pertinent to whether one party owes a duty to
another, 6 the appellate court quoted at length from Peter W., making only a few
observations of its own.3 ' It elaborated on the Peter W. court's concern for the lack
of a workable standard of care, stating that recognizing a cause of action for edu-
cational malpractice "would impermissibly require the courts to oversee the admin-
istration of the State's public school system."' 8 It also emphasized the practical
difficulties that confront a student when attempting to prove that the conduct
proximately caused his failure to learn.39 In accordance with Peter W., the court
held that no duty existed.4"
One member of the three-judge panel dissented. Judge Suozzi, although prin-
cipally concerned with Donohue's alternative argument that the New York
Constitution created a duty of care applicable to schools and teachers,4 also argued
that the problem of establishing the cause of a learning deficiency posed "a question
of proof to be resolved at a trial" and was not a reason to dismiss the action.42 Judge
Suozzi also rejected the majority's concern about feigned claims and the establish-
ment of an appropriate measure of damages, noting that such concerns had been
deemed insignificant in other contexts in which novel causes of action were pro-
posed.43 He believed that Donohue's complaint was similar in material respects to
a complaint alleging medical malpractice arising out of a failure to diagnose and
treat a dangerous condition-Donohue's failing grades evidenced a potentially
serious condition that defendants made no attempt to diagnose and treat, even
though they had, as does a doctor who renders professional services, a duty to do so."
'Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 95 Misc. 2d 1 ...... 408 N.Y.2d 584, 585 (Sup. Ct.
Suffolk County 1977).
Id.
'Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 64 A.D.2d 29, 407 N.Y.S.2d 874 (1978).
'See id. at .... , 407 N.Y.S.2d at 877.
'rSee id. at . 407 N.Y.S.2d at 878.
' Id. at .._ 407 N.Y.S.2d at 879. To support this conclusion, the court referred to and quoted from
two New York decisions in which the court declined invitations to review educational judgments made by
the New York Commissioner of Education in the exercise of his administrative discretion. Vetere v.
Allen, 15 N.Y.2d 259, 267, 206 N.E.2d 174, 176, 258 N.Y.S.2d 77, 80 (1965); James v. Board of
Educ., 42 N.Y.2d 357, 366 N.E.2d 1291, 397 N.Y.S.2d 934 (1977).
2 64 A.D.2d at .407 N.Y.S.2d at 878.
'oId. at ....4 't07 N.Y.S.2d at 878. The court, with one judge dissenting, also dismissed Donohue's
second count involving the New York State Constitution. 64 A.D. 2d at .... 407 N.Y.S2d at 880-81.
See also note 32 supra.
"See note 32 supra.
4264 A.D.2d at . 407 N.Y.S.2d at 883 (Suozzi, J., dissenting).
'3 The dissent stated: "Under the circumstances, there is no reason to differentiate between educational
malpractice on the one hand, and other forms of negligence and malpractice litigation which currently
congest our courts." id. at . 407 N.Y.S.2d at 883.
"Id. at .407 N.Y.S.2d at 885 (Suozzi, J., dissenting).
1981]
KANSAS LAW REVIEW
3. The New York Court of Appeals
The Appellate Division's decision was appealed to the New York Court of
Appeals. That court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint.4" The Court of
Appeals conceded that an action for educational malpractice, like other claims for
professional malpractice, could be formally pleaded. Departing from the observa-
tions in Peter W. and the appellate division's opinion, the Court of Appeals stated that
articulating a standard of care was not necessarily an unsurmountable burden; that
proving causation, while difficult, might not be impossible; and that it was possible
that plaintiff had suffered a measurable "injury."4 The court nevertheless declined
"as a matter of public policy" to entertain the cause of action.47 The court stated
that the authority to make educational policy decisions was vested in the Board of
Regents and the Commissioner of Education, not in the courts, and that a common
law cause of action did not exist because the administrative agencies had sole
authority to evaluate such claims.4 8
C. Hoffman v. Board of Education
1. The Trial Court
The holding in Donohue that no cause of action exists for educational mal-
practice was refined in Hofiman v. Board of Education." Hoffman suffered from
a speech abnormality that developed immediately after his father died. Hoffman,
then only thirteen months old, had started talking and walking, but retrogressed
after his father's death." When Hoffman was nearly five years old and still in-
capable of speaking properly, his mother took him to the National Hospital for
Speech Disorders. The hospital's records noted that the child exhibited virtually
no intelligible speech and appeared to be retarded. Psychological tests were recom-
mended. One month later, Hoffman was given a nonverbal intelligence test, the
results of which indicated that his IQ was within the range of normal intelligence.5 1
A few months after Hoffman entered kindergarten, he was given a primarily
verbal intelligence test. On that test, he achieved an IQ score of 74, which indicated
borderline intelligence and was one point below the statutory cutoff for placement
in classes for children with retarded mental development (CRMD). Because of the
findings of borderline intelligence, the examiner recommended retesting within two
years. At the time of testing, however, the examiner did not request Hoffman's
'547 N.Y.2d 440, 391 N.E. 2d 1352, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1979).
"Ild. at 443, 391 N.E.2d at 1353-54, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 377.
" The court stated:
The fact that a complaint alleging "educational malpractice might on the pleadings state a cause
of action within traditional notions of tort law does not, however, require that it be sustained. The
heart of the matter is whether, assuming that such a cause of action may be stated, the courts
should, as a matter of public policy, entertain such claims. We believe they should not.
Id. at 443-44, 391 N.E.2d at 1354, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 377.
48Id. at 444-45, 391 N.E.2d at 1354, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 377-78. In a concurring opinion, two justices
endorsed the lower court's concern for the manageability of educational malpractice claims and the
difficulty of proving causation. These two justices would have gone further than the rest of the court
and would have used these factors as additional bases upon which to refuse to recognize the cause of
action. See id. at 445-46, 391 N.E.2d at 1355, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 378-79 (Wachtler and Gabrielli, JJ.,
concurring).
4964 A.D.2d 369, 410 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1978), rev'd, 49 N.Y.2d 121, 400 N.E.2d 317, 424 N.Y.S.2d 376
(1979).
564 A.D.2d at . 410 N.Y.S.2d at 101. The facts outlined in the text are supplemented, based on
a brief filed by plaintiff, in the discussion in Note, Nonliability for Negligence in the Public Schools, 55
NOTRE DAME LAW. 814 (1980).
"64 A.D.2d at ..... 410 N.Y.S.2d at 101.
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social history, which would have revealed the retrogression commencing at the time
of his father's death. The examiner also made no request for Hoffman's examination
history. This history would have indicated that Hoffman was of normal intelli-
gence.52
Later that year, Hoffman was placed in his first CRMD class. His mother was
not informed of his borderline IQ score or her right to request a reexamination.
After Hoffman attended CRMD classes for twelve years, he was administered an
IQ test that indicated his intelligence to be well within the normal range. Because
of this test, Hoffman was no longer eligible for the occupational training program
that he had been enrolled in for two years.
Later in the school year, Hoffman was given additional IQ examinations, all of
which indicated that he was of normal intelligence. The psychologist who admin-
istered several of the tests concluded that Hoffman's learning potential had always
been above average, but that his intellectual development had been impaired by the
original incorrect diagnosis of retardation and his consequently diminished edu-
cational stimulation.3 He showed little improvement despite subsequent therapy
and rehabilitation and at the time of the trial was a part-time messenger earning
fifty dollars per week. 4 Hoffman sued the Board of Education of the City of New
York. A jury awarded him 750,000 dollars in damages. 5
2. The New York Appellate Division
The trial court's judgment was appealed to the Appellate Division of the New
York Supreme Court, which in a three-to-two decision affirmed the judgment but
remitted the award to 500,000 dollars. The court held that evidence that defendant,
through its agents, ignored the recommendation that Hoffman be retested was, by
itself, sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict.5 6
The dissenting justices contended that the case should not have been submitted
to the jury. Justice Martuscello concluded that the evidence demonstrated no
impropriety by defendant. 7 Justice Damiani, however, asserted in a separate
dissenting opinion that the complaint sought to recover for educational malpractice
which, under the Donohue decision, did not constitute a cause of action.5 He con-
tended (1) that Hoffman entered school with improper speech patterns and a lack
of knowledge and experience; (2) that his learning deficiencies resulted from his
defective communication skills; and (3) that his speech was no worse when he
finished school than when he started. 9 Under Donohue, Justice Damiani reasoned,
lack of educational achievement was not a legally- cognizable injury for which
Hoffman could recover.60
The majority rejected Justice Damiani's argument on the ground that edu-
cational malpractice was a theory intended only to remedy nonfeasance and that
causes of action for misfeasance, or affirmative negligence, in the classroom were not
52 1d. at ..... 410 N.Y.S.2d at 102-03.
mId. at ..... 410 N.Y.S.2d at 106.MId. at ..... 410 N.Y.S.2d at 106.
MId. at .410 N.Y.S.2d at 100.
"Id. at...., 410 N.Y.S.2d at 109.
5764 A.D.2d at .... , 410 N.Y.S.2d at 111 (Martuscello, J. dissenting).
' 64 A.D.2d at ..... 410 N.Y.S.2d at 117 (Damiani, J., dissenting). It appears from the structure of the
opinions that each writing Justice revised his opinion at least twice, probably responding to revisions from
the opposing Justices.




foreclosed by Donohue. The majority reasoned that Hoffman's injury did not result
from nonfeasance, but instead from misfeasance. The affirmative negligence con-
sisted of the failure "to follow the individualized and specific prescription of de-
fendant's own certified psychologist, whose very decision it was in the first place, to
place plaintiff in a class for retarded children."6
Justice Damiani, responding to the misfeasance-nonfeasance distinction, argued
that the complaints in Donohue and Hofiman alleged acts of both commission and
omission. If anything, Hoffman was injured by an act of omission, namely the
failure to retest him after two years, while Donohue was injured by an act of
commission-the rendering of improper or ineffective instruction.6 2 Accordingly,
Justice Damiani questioned the validity of the distinction between action and
inaction and rejected the majority's contention that the facts in Donohue were
distinguishable. In any event, Justice Damiani argued, the misfeasance-nonfeasance
distinction was immaterial, since negligent behavior can be either active or passive.
The essential question for Justice Damiani was whether a duty existed, and he
followed the rule in Donohue to determine that no duty existed."3
3. The New York Court of Appeals
With the arguments so framed, the Appellate Division's opinion sustaining the
jury's verdict was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. That court reversed
in a four-to-three decision. 4 The majority, in a terse opinion by Judge Jaren, agreed
with Justice Damiani that Hoffman's claim sounded in "educational malpractice"
and that under Donohue such a cause of action should not, as a matter of public
policy, be entertained. 5 The majority adopted Justice Damiani's view that both
Donohue and the instant case involved acts of commission and omission, and that
the policy considerations noted in Donohue favoring nonrecognition of the cause of
action applied with equal force to "educational malpractice" actions alleging mis-
feasance and to those alleging nonfeasance. 6 The three dissenting judges, in a one
paragraph opinion, approved the lower court's opinion. They agreed that the case
involved "discernible affirmative negligence on the part of the board of education"
in failing to retest Hoffman, rather than educational malpractice. 7
II. THE COLLISION OF THEORY AND POLICY
A. Result vs. Doctrine: Inherent Inconsistencies
Although the courts in Peter W., Donohue, and Hofiman held that plaintiffs'
complaints failed to state causes of action, their views concerning the extent to which
a cause of action for educational malpractice was consistent with traditional tort prin-
ciples differed considerably. In determining whether a duty existed, the court in Peter
W. analyzed the various components of duty and concluded that the determinative
6164 A.D.2d at . 410 N.Y.S.2d at 110. The court agreed with Professor Diamond who wrote that
plaintiff's case did not involve so much a failure to act but rather "affirmative acts of negligence which
imposed additional and crippling burdens upon a student." Id. (quoting Diamond, Educational Law,
29 SYRACUSE L. REV. 103, 150-51 (1978)).
"2 64 A.D.2d at ..... 410 N.Y.S.2d at 118 (Damiani, J., dissenting).SaId.
"449 N.Y.2d 121, 400 N.E.2d 317, 424 N.Y.S.2d 376 (1979).
Old. at 125, 400 N.E.2d at 319, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 378.
6 Id. at 126, 400 N.E.2d at 320, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 379.71d. at 127, 400 N.E.2d at 321, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 380 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
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components of duty did not support recognition of the cause of action. The New York
Court of Appeals in Donohue and Hofiman conceded that, under a traditional
analysis, the cause of action could be pleaded, but held purely and simply as a matter
of public policy that the cause of action should not be recognized. Obviously, the
court in Peter W., in applying a traditional test, was engaged in making delicate
public policy judgments,6" but the New York Court of Appeals was more candid
when it did so. As many commentators have urged in support of the dissent in
Donohue, the logic upon which the holdings in Peter W., Donohue, and ultimately
Hofman rest is not satisfactory.
It has been widely noted that the three concerns articulated by the court in
Peter W.6" and reiterated by the New York Supreme Court in Donohue7 are un-
persuasive. First, although providing a remedy for plaintiffs who have incurred
learning deficiencies is difficult, this difficulty is not a forceful reason for refusing
to recognize the tort of educational malpractice. Projecting the lost future earnings
of a student who proves he cannot acquire meaningful employment is difficult, but
certainly not impossible.71 The absence of physical injury is not determinative since
there are several torts under which damages may be recovered for mental distress.7 2
Second, the concern that no standard of care exists against which the school's
conduct can be measured is not unreasonable, but it is easily exaggerated. Notwith-
standing an often-expressed reluctance to intervene in questions of educational
policy,7' and notwithstanding persuasive evidence of the absence of a uniformly
accepted standard-or "custom of the profession"-against which a teacher's or
school's conduct must be measured, 4 courts have in a variety of contexts appraised
the strengths and weaknesses of particular educational programs, environments, and
modes of instruction. 5
' The classic attempt to define what constitutes a duty is found in Raymond v. Paradise United School
Dist., 218 Cal. App. 2d 1, 31 Cal. Rptr. 847 (1963), upon which the court in Peter W. relied. In Ray-
mond, the court conceded that its definition of a duty was grounded in "various and sometimes delicate
policy judgments." Id. at .. 31 Cal. Rptr. at 851.
'"See text accompanying notes 24-26 supra.
'o See text accompanying notes 36-39 supra.
71Elson, supra note 4, at 759-61. When education is considered a marital asset to be divided between
spouses pursuant to a divorce settlement, courts place a value on skills or education insofar as they affect
future earning capacity. E.g., In re Marriage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885, 890 (Iowa 1978); Daniels
v. Daniels, 20 Ohio App. 2d 458, ...., 185 N.E.2d 773, 775 (1961). See generally Krauskopf, Recompense
for Financing Spouse's Education: Legal Protection for the Marital Investor in Human Capital, 28 KAN.
L. REv. 379 (1980).
Although courts have been reluctant to award damages for mental distress as a tort in and of itself
and typically have not done so in the absence of physical injury or intentional infliction of the distress,
courts have not hesitated to award such damages in a variety of circumstances. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF
TORTS § 12, at 51-52 (4th ed. 1971).
"
3See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 589-91 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting); Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97,
104 (1968); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 652 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
" See Elson, supra note 4, at 709-19. But see Green v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 365 So.2d 834, 838
(La. App. 1978) ("the teacher's instruction and preparation for and supervision of the [wrestling] drill
in which plaintiff was injured [did not fall] below any locally or nationally accepted reasonable standard
of care for teachers under similar circumstances").
In desegregation cases, courts make judgments about the quality of education in racially unbalanced
schools. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 737 (1974); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S.
483, 495 (1954). Questions of public school financing directly impact upon the quality of education.
E.g., San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). First amendment issues
have forced courts to decide what may or may not be taught in the schools. E.g., Epperson v. Arkansas,
393 U.S. 97 (1968). In considering the statutory rights of handicapped children, courts have evaluated
the quality and effect of the efforts of educators. E.g., In re Peter H., 66 Misc. 2d 1097, 323 N.Y.S.2d 302
(Fam. Ct. 1971). The question of compulsory language programs for non-English speaking students also
requires courts to appraise the quality of education. E.g., Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974). See
Elson, supra note 4, at 689-90.
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Third, that factors unrelated to the teacher's or school's conduct, such as social,
economic, or cultural factors, might cause the failure to learn is certainly a valid
concern, but it does not support a refusal to recognize educational malpractice. The
probable effect of these factors in many cases does not mean that a teacher's or
school's conduct was not a cause of the failure to learn. Indeed, Hofiman illustrates
that in some circumstances a causal link between a school's conduct and a student's
injury can be documented with probative evidence. 76 In any event, proving causation
does not require proof that no other factors contributed to a result: if A negligently
spills gasoline, and B ignites the gasoline, which results in damage to C, A is liable
for C's damage, even though A's act by itself was not sufficient to injure C.7  Thus,
that other circumstances may have contributed to educational deficiencies does not
provide a basis to presume conclusively that all defendants cannot be held liable for
educational torts.
In Donohue the New York Court of Appeals was sensitive to the weaknesses in
the rationale underlying Peter W. and the New York Appellate Division's opinion in
Donohue. Indeed, the court agreed in substance with the lower court's dissent in
Donohue: "It may very well be that even within the strictures of a traditional
negligence or malpractice action, a complaint sounding in 'educational malpractice'
may be formally pleaded."7 8 Even though the cause of action was consistent with
traditional principles, the court concluded that, as a matter of policy, lawsuits alleging
nonachievement due to the negligence of teachers and schools should not be enter-
tained. Donohue and Peter W. illustrate the tension that exists between theory and
policy whenever a court is asked to recognize the presence of a duty where none
has previously been acknowledged. The Court of Appeals in Donohue realized
that its holding could not be articulated consistently with traditional tort doctrines,
and it did not attempt to be consistent.
B. Results vs. Doctrine: The Impact Rule Analogy, Zones of Duty, and Professional
Malpractice Generally
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that within the confines of traditional
tort principles, duties may logically exist, but if a court is persuaded that society's
interests are not served by permitting plaintiffs generally to sue for breach of the
duty, the court must either reconcile a policy-oriented result with traditional
7064 A.D.2d 369, 410 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1978), rev'd, 49 N.Y.2d 121, 400 N.E.2d 317, 424 N.Y.S.2d
376 (1979).
tTrapp v. Standard Oil Co., 176 Kan. 39, 269 P.2d 469 (1954).
8 47 N.Y.2d at 443, 391 N.E.2d at 1353, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 377. The Court of Appeals had no
difficulty with the proposition that a duty exists for which there are readily available standards to determine
that breaches occurred:
[T~he imagination need not be overly taxed to envision allegations of a legal duty of care flowing
from educators, if viewed as professionals, to their students. If doctors, lawyers, architects, engineers,
and other professionals are charged with a duty owing to the public whom they serve, it could
be said that nothing in the law precludes similar treatment of professional educators. Nor would
creation of a standard with which to judge an educator's performance of that duty necessarily
pose an insurmountable obstacle.
Id. Similarly, the remaining elements of proximate causation and injury did not, in the Court of Appeals'
view, raise insurmountable obstacles:
As for proximate causation, while this element might indeed be difficult, if not impossible, to
prove in view of the many collateral factors involved in the learning process, it perhaps assumes
too much to conclude that it could never be established. This would leave only the element of
injury and who can in good faith deny that a student who upon graduation from high school
cannot comprehend simple English-a deficiency allegedly attributable to the negligence of his
educators-has not in some fashion been "injured".
Id., 391 N.E.2d at 1353-54, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 377.
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principles, which is difficult to do cogently, or it must repudiate the traditional
analysis and announce an undisguised policy judgment. This collision between
theory and policy in educational malpractice is in some respects analogous to that
which occurred when plaintiffs first challenged the "impact rule." Interestingly, the
arguments that favor the impact rule are virtually identical to those that have been
made against recognition of a cause of action for educational malpractice.
Courts have grappled for years with the question whether plaintiffs could recover
for mental distress in the absence of actual physical impact between the plaintiff
and some instrumentality placed in motion by the defendant.7 9 The first cases that
refused to overrule the impact rule cited the difficulty of proving causation between
an injury and the "fright" allegedly causing the injury. The courts also acknowl-
edged a fear of feigned claims, and a fear of a "flood of litigation.""0 With time,
however, many courts realized that these concerns were insignificant and recognized
the cause of action.81 When the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania confronted the
question in Niederman v. Brodsky,8 2 it concluded that the "inherent humanitarianism
of our judicial process and its responsiveness to the current needs of justice" man-
dated that in the absence of actual impact, plaintiffs still should be given the op-
portunity to present their claims.8" Difficulty in proving a causal connection did not,
in the court's view, "represent sufficient reason to deny [plaintiff] an opportunity to
prove his case to a jury."84 The court held that the possibilities of fraudulent claims
and increased litigation were minimal and well within the judiciary's ability to
manage.8
5
Courts that recognized a cause of action for an injury caused by another person's
negligence but without impact typically required plaintiff to have been in actual
physical danger.8 6 These courts were soon asked to recognize a cause of action for
injury even when there was no threat of physical injury. Substantially the same
"'The close relationship between duty of care and proximate cause makes it difficult to determine if a
court, when considering whether a plaintiff could recover for mental injuries absent impact, assumed the
existence of duty and then sought to limit the scope of acts or omissions that could proximately relate to an
injury, or if a court was focusing directly on the scope of the duty. See, e.g., Whetham v. Bismarck
Hosp., 197 N.W.2d 678 (N.D. 1972); Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d 84 (1970). In
any event, it seems clear that most cases assume a relationship exists between the negligent actor and the
injured party that entails some sort of duty, although the zone of that duty may not be broad enough to
permit recoveries for mental injuries absent an impact. See, e.g., Cosgrove v. Beymer, 244 F. Supp. 824
(D. Del. 1965) (daughter walking within four feet of father when father was run over cannot recover
for mental injury); Lessard v. Tarca, 20 Conn. Supp. 295, 133 A.2d 625 (1957) (members of family
who survived auto accident could not recover for mental injuries suffered while watching daughter
pinned in wreckage burn to death); Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 617, 249 N.E.2d 419, 423, 301
N.Y.S.2d 554, 560 (1969) (conceptualizes issue in terms of "extend[ing] the duty").
'E.g., Kalen v. Terre Haute & I.R.R., 18 Ind. App. 202, 205-13, 47 N.E. 694, 696-98 (1897); Mitchell
v. Rochester R.R., 151 N.Y. 107, 110, 45 N.E. 354, 355 (1896).
' Most courts that have considered abandoning the impact rule have repudiated it. See Niederman v.
Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 401 n.1, 261 A.2d 84, 85 n.1 (1970) (noting that at least 22 of 31 courts considering
the question have abandoned the impact rule). Some courts have rejected the reasoning of the majority
position. E.g., Towns v. Anderson, 567 P.2d 814, 816 (Colo. App. 1977); Gilliam v. Stewart, 291 So.
2d 593, 595 (Fla. 1974); Benza v. Shulman Air Freight, 46 Ill. App. 3d 521, .. 361 N.E.2d 91, 94
(1977). See generally Annot., Right to Recover Damages in Negligence for Fear of Injury To Another, Or
Shock Or Mental Anguish at Witnessing Such Injury, 29 A.L.R.3d 1337 (1970).
' 436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d 84 (1970).
"The plaintiff in Niederman suffered coronary problems after witnessing defendant, who was oper-
ating a motor vehicle, run over his son. ld. at . 261 A.2d at 84-85.
Id. at ..... 261 A.2d at 87 (emphasis in original).
SId. at . 261 A.2d at 88-89.
'E.g., id. at .... 261 A.2d at 90; Whetham v. Bismarck Hosp., 197 N.W.2d 678, 684 (N.D. 1972).
Not all courts, however, have adopted this restriction when abrogating the impact rule. E.g., Daley v.
LaCroix, 384 Mich. 4 ..... 179 N.W.2d 390, 395 (1970); Hughes v. Moore, 214 Va. 27, 34-35, 197
S.E.2d 214, 219-20 (1973).
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arguments used by courts to abrogate the impact rule were used to support elimina-
tion of the requirement that plaintiff be within the zone of physical danger. Yet
courts were-and generally continue to be-reluctant to enlarge the zone throughout
which the duty of care extends.8 7 Not surprisingly, the rationale most often used to
justify retention of the requirement that plaintiff be within the zone of physical
danger is, purely and simply, "public policy." 8
The evolution of the impact rule illustrates that situations occur in which one's
actions may in fact cause injury to another and the injury is foreseeable, but no duty is
owed to the other person. The results in these cases, not surprisingly, are subject to
vigorous criticism. Yet, at a certain point, most people agree that not every wrong
deserves a remedy; that it is not in society's interest to remedy every wrong; that
seemingly arbitrary demarcations between wrongs that will be remedied and those
that will not must be drawn; that explanations of the line-drawing will be strained;
and that reasonable criticism will accompany, or at least quickly develop after the
line-drawing.
The refusal of courts to recognize a cause of action for educational malpractice
can be defended as but another instance of line-drawing that inevitably occurs on the
frontiers of recognized zones of duty. The opinions in Peter W., Donohue, and
ultimately Hoffman read as if the courts were listening to the arguments that were
advanced in the impact cases and were merely engaging in line-drawing to protect
legitimate societal values. The question presented by the impact cases, however, was
quite different than that raised in the educational malpractice cases. The analysis in
the impact cases began with the assumption that defendant's act violated some duty
for which a person within the zone of duty could recover if the other elements of the
tort could be proved.89 Thus, the question was essentially how far to extend the
zone of duty. In Peter W., Donohue, and Hogman, the courts decided that no zone
of duty existed at all. This outcome, like that in the impact cases, may also be
intended to protect legitimate societal values, but to say "the line must be drawn
somewhere" does not justify the result. The decision not to recognize an entire
zone of duty should be consistent with decisions to recognize or not to recognize
zones in closely related contexts. The existence of zones of duty in closely related
settings is a persuasive indicator that a zone of duty exists, or should be recognized,
in the educational setting.
As the court suggested in Donohue, educational malpractice cases are appro-
priately analogized to other professional malpractice cases."0 For example, in medical
malpractice, troublesome questions of causation frequently arise, but the existence
of causation questions does not immunize physicians from liability by removing the
duty of care. A patient's outrageous eating and smoking habits may necessitate
open-heart surgery, during which the physician makes a negligent, incapacitating
error. The patient's physical problems, which have been exacerbated by his own
'See Grimsby v. Samson, 85 Wash. 2d 52 ...... 530 P.2d 291, 293-95 (1975).
'See Guilmette v. Alexander, 128 Vt. 116, 259 A.2d 12 (1969), quoting Waube v. Warrington, 216
Wis. 603, 613, 258 N.W.2d 497, 500-01 (1975):
[T]hc answer to fthc] question cannot be reached solely by logic, nor is it clear that it can be
entirely disposed of by a consideration of what the defendant ought reasonably to have anticipated
as a consequence of his wrong. The answer must be reached by balancing the social interests
involved in order to ascertain how far defendant's duty and plaintiff's right may justly and
expediently be extended.
Id. at ..... 259 A.2d at 14.
'See note 79 supra.
"° See note 78 supra.
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conduct, and which could be fatal but for medical assistance, do not bar a mal-
practice action. On the contrary, the patient has the opportunity to prove that the
doctor's negligence prevented him from becoming more healthy. By the same token,
a student may be culturally deprived or may be less than diligent in his studies, but
this should not bar him from attempting to prove negligence that prevented him
from attaining greater proficiencies. The stark similarity of these causes of action
and the willingness of courts to recognize a duty in one case but not in the other
strongly suggests that something is amiss in the theoretical underpinnings of Peter
W. and Donohue.
C. Attempted Reconciliation as Evidence of Inherent Inconsistencies
To approach the problem differently, the difficulty with the theoretical justifica-
tion of Peter W. and Donohue is evidenced by the holding in Hofiman. The New
York Supreme Court, doubtless constrained by its Donohue decision, attempted to
distinguish Hoffman's injury, which strikes ordinary sensibilities as a wrong that
deserves a remedy, from the injury alleged in Donohue." To reach the "fair" result,
the court had no other option because under the holding in Donohue, lack of edu-
cational achievement is not an injury for which a student may sue. Hoffman would
therefore have no cause of action, much less a recovery, unless the circumstances of
his injury somehow differed from those surrounding Donohue's injury. 2
Facially, the efforts of the supreme court to reconcile Hoffman's recovery with
the holding in Donohue that no cause of action exists for educational malpractice
are persuasive. Hoffman, unlike the plairftiffs in Donohue and Peter W., was the
victim of a specific, identifiable failure on the part of the school. The school did not
follow a specific recommendation of its psychologist. 3 The damages incurred by
Hoffman were apparent, and the causal link between defendant's negligence and the
injuries he incurred was supported by probative evidence. Hoffman's situation is
different from that of Peter W. or Donohue, either of whom is likely to be charact-
erized as a disgruntled student seeking a scapegoat for learning deficiencies caused
by personal laziness.
On closer analysis, however, the differences between Hoffman's situation on the
one hand and Donohue's or Peter W.'s situation on the other are qualitatively
insignificant. Each plaintiff charged that the school system failed to appraise prop-
erly his ability to learn. Hoffman was incorrectly diagnosed as a non-learner and
was placed in a setting that was counterproductive to his needs. Peter W. and Don-
ohue were incorrectly perceived as learners and were placed in settings in which
"See Note, Nonliability for Negligence in the Public Schools-"Edcational Malpractice" from Peter
W. to Hoffman, 55 NOTRE DAME LAW. 814, 831-32 (1980) (arguing that Hofiman and Donohue are
dissimilar, and that "educational malpractice" is a narrow concept inapplicable in Hofiman).
"By analyzing the educational malpractice cases as questions of the existence of a duty rather than as
a question of proximate cause, the courts have missed one analytical approach that permits Hofiman to
be distinguished from Donohue and Peter W. Duty and proximate causation are closely related concepts.
See W. PROSsER, TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 383-84 (5th ed. 1971). Whether a duty exists, however, is
a question of law for determination by the court, while proximate causation is usually a question of fact.
Support exists for the proposition that when the evidence permits only one reasonable conclusion on the
issue of proximate cause, the issue becomes a matter of law for the court to determine. See, e.g., Fruehauf
Trailer Div. v. Thornton, 366 N.E.2d 21 (Ind. App. 1977). Under this standard, frivolous cases in which
a student without justification alleges educational malpractice will not reach a jury, whereas a student
like Hoffman can get his case to a jury and recover if a preponderance of the evidence supports his
allegations.
"'At the time Hoffman was found to be retarded, the testing psychologist recommended that he be
retested within two years. See text at note 52 supra.
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they were not intellectually stimulated or advanced. Both situations, according to
the allegations of the complaints, involved the failure of school systems to provide
appropriate educational services, which ultimately resulted in the students' inability
to obtain decent jobs or otherwise to assume a productive role in society.
The only practical difference between Hofiman and the other cases is that
Hoffman could prove his claim, while it was not clear at the outset of their cases
that either Peter W. or Donohue could. This difference is not a basis for holding
that the schools owed no duty to Peter W. or Donohue. The New York Court of
Appeals probably perceived the inconsistencies developing in its precedents. To
reconcile these inconsistencies, however, it chose in Hobfman not to reverse its prior
judgment that Donohue could not state a cause of action, but instead stated the
rule that no student-including a student like Hoffman-can assert a cause of action.
Thus, the court avoided the inconsistency that would occur if Hoffman were
allowed to state a claim while Donohue was not by applying its holding in Donohue,
that no duty exists in the educational setting to instruct competently. In eliminating
this inconsistency, however, the court created another one: although similar zones of
duty are recognized in closely-related professional fields, and although, as the Court
of Appeals virtually conceded, there is no cogent basis for not applying those
principles to educational malpractice claims,9 4 the court approved a principle that
treats educational torts differently than torts in other professional areas.
D. Proof of Inherent Inconsistencies: Educational Malpractice and the Educator's
Duty to Supervise
In Peter W. the court briefly confronted the central theoretical deficiency in the
rule that there is no duty to instruct in a manner that does not impede students'
normal attainment of skills and knowledge: the duty to instruct competently is
functionally and legally indistinguishable from the firmly established duty of
teachers and school officials to supervise students on the school grounds to prevent
physical injury. 5 While the cases recognizing the duty to supervise to prevent
physical injury are different in some respects from the cases considering whether a
duty to instruct competently exists, the distinctions do not justify inconsistent treat-
ment of injuries suffered as a result of negligent supervision and injuries suffered as
a result of negligent instruction.
It is well-settled that a cause of action exists for a school's or a teacher's failure
to supervise adequately conduct on school grounds that threatens students with
physical injury. 6 The duty to supervise to prevent physical injury extends, not
surprisingly, to settings in which the risk of physical injury is substantial, such as
the gymnasium and the vocational shop,9 7 when the teacher's proper instructions are
essential to protect the students from injury. Thus, when a high school student was
paralyzed while wrestling in a physical education class, the teacher's instructions to
" 47 N.Y.2d at . 391 N.E.2d at 1353, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 377.
'This argument was before the court in Peter W. Plaintiff argued that a duty ran from teachers to
students, citing the cases in which physical injury to students resulted from a failure to supervise. The
court rejected this suggestion, stating only, without further analysis, that physical injuries-not mental
injuries-were involved in those cases, and hence, the cases and the argument were not applicable. 60 Cal.
App. 3d at ..... 131 Cal. Rptr. at 858.
E.g., cases cited and discussed in Annot., Tort Liability of Public Schools and Institutions of Higher
Learning for Injuries Resulting From Lack or Insufficiency of Supervision, 38 A.L.R.3d 830 (1971).
"7E.g., Bellman v. San Francisco High School Dist., 11 Cal. 2d 576 .... , 81 P.2d 894, 897-98 (1938);
Matteucci v. High School Dist. No. 208, 4 I11. App. 3d 710 ...... 281 N.E.2d 383, 386-87 (1972); Keesee
v. Board of Educ., 37 Misc. 2d 414, 235 N.Y.S.2d 300 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1962).
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perform a particular wrestling escape were questioned because of the student's level
of wrestling proficiency. 8 It is easy to envision a case in which a woodworking
teacher incorrectly instructs a student in the use of a power saw, and the student,
following precisely the teacher's instruction, injures his hand. In these examples, the
competence of instruction-as distinguished from supervision-is at the core of the
question of liability and there is a duty to instruct competently.
Imposition of the duty is eminently sensible, for classroom instruction has many
of the attributes of supervision. Learning largely emanates from the individual.
The student's attentiveness, his willingness to practice the reasoning techniques
being imparted to him, and his dedication to studying assigned materials that
supplement classroom instruction are all key elements of the learning process. In all
of these functions, the teacher plays a "supervisory" role, directing and leading the
student through the work and materials the student must assimilate in order to learn.
The chemistry classroom illustrates the coextensiveness of the supervisory and
teaching function, where experiments, instead of reading assignments or mathe-
matical problems, play a principal role in the learning process. Schools often have
been held liable for the negligence of chemistry teachers during experiments that
cause physical injury to students. Typical of the cases illustrating that a school or
teacher has a duty to instruct properly in a manner that prevents injury to students
is Mastrangelo v. West Side Union High School District.9 9 A required experiment
during which plaintiff was injured involved the mixing of explosives. The textbook
instructions directed the student to powder or pulverize certain ingredients sepa-
rately on sheets of paper. Instead of following these directions, plaintiff, an in-
telligent student, used a pestle to mix and grind the ingredients of the explosive,
including one incorrect ingredient, in an iron mortar. While grinding the ingre-
dients, an explosion occurred that severely injured plaintiff. He sued the school on
the theory that the negligent instruction or supervision of the dangerous experiment
caused his injury. A nonsuit was granted for defendant prior to submitting the case
to the jury, and plaintiff appealed. In reversing the nonsuit, the appellate court
recognized the existence of a duty to instruct the students in a manner designed to
protect their safety:
It is not unreasonable to assume that it is the duty of a teacher of chemistry, in the
exercise of ordinary care, to instruct students regarding the selection, mingling,
and use of ingredients with which dangerous experiments are to be accomplished,
rather than to merely hand them a text-book with general instructions to follow
the text .... It is the province of the jury to determine whether the mixing of the
ingredients which were used to compound gunpowder in a mortar by means of a
pestle increase the danger of an explosion; whether the plaintiff was without
previous knowledge or instruction regarding that danger, and whether that process
was knowingly permitted to be followed by the pupil without warning from the
teacher. It may also be a proper question for the determination of the jury as to
whether the delivery of a text-book to an inexperienced pupil with mere instruc-
tions to follow the text, in the performance of a dangerous experiment in chemistry,
is a sufficient exercise of care. 10
"Green v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 365 So. 2d 834, 838 (La. App. 1978) (wrestling class).
2 Cal. 2d 540, 42 P.2d 634 (1935).
Id. at ..... 42 P.2d at 636 (emphasis added). In Klenzendorf v. Shasta Union High School




Mastrangelo recognized a duty to instruct properly: the teacher failed to impart
knowledge about the experiment he reasonably should have imparted. The student's
injury could have been prevented if the teacher had exercised his supervisory power
to intervene and halt the experiment, or if he had performed adequately his in-
struction function, thereby imparting knowledge that would have ensured safe
performance of the experiment. The failure to instruct adequately was alleged by
each of the plaintiffs in Peter W., Donohue, and Hofiman.
One arguable distinction between Mastrangelo and the educational malpractice
cases is the area in which the injury occurred. It is well-settled, however, that injuries
occurring outside the classroom but arising out of in-the-classroom negligence are
not necessarily outside the zone of proximate causation. While most of the cases
holding that schools have a duty to protect students from physical injury involve
activities that occur on school grounds, 01 many cases that recognize the duty involve
injuries that occurred outside the school's boundaries."0 2
The chemistry classroom again illustrates this proposition. In Engel v. Gosper
a0 3
a child was killed by the explosion of a homemade rocket ignited by two high
school students. In addition to bringing an action against the students, the decedent's
administratrix sued their science teachers and the school boards that employed the
teachers. Plaintiff alleged that the teachers improperly instructed the students with
respect to rockets, encouraged their experiments with rockets, and thereby con-
tributed to the accident. The court, although conceding that the claims against the
teachers and schools were "tenuous," denied a motion to dismiss.' Accordingly,
Engel supports the proposition that a teacher may be liable if he encourages a
student to conduct an experiment at home and gives the student improper instruc-
tions that contribute to an accidental injury that occurs outside the classroom. Of
course, the obstacles to proving causation are substantial in such a case. Significant
intervening causes may supersede the negligence of the teacher, a possibility that
You are instructed that if you find from the evidence that the plaintiff . . . was injured while
operating a hand jointer . . . and that the defendants negligently failed to instruct said plaintiff
in the operation of said hand jointer, and that such negligent failure was the direct and proximate
cause of the injury sustained by him, you are to find for said plaintiff [absent finding contributory
negligence].
Id. at 882.
... See generally Annot., supra note 96.
"In Hoyem v. Manhattan Beach City School Dist., 22 Cal. 3d 731, 585 P.2d 851, 150 Cal. Rptr. 1
(1978), a ten-year old student-truant was struck by a motorcycle after leaving the school grounds without
permission. The trial court sustained the school's motion to dismiss, ruling that the school had no "duty"
to prevent off-campus injuries because such injuries, as a matter of law, could not be proximately caused
by negligent, on-campus supervision. The court, however, concluded that it was "foreseeable" that
students might wander off from school during a lapse of supervision. Id. at ..... 585 P.2d at 858, 150 Cal.
Rptr. at 8. The school could be liable "so long as [the school's] negligent supervision was an actual
('but for') cause of the injury and the general type of injury was reasonably foreseeable." Id. at .... n.6, 585
P.2d at 858 n.6, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 8 n.6. The existence of other intervening causes would not necessarily
absolve the school from liability; that another party's "misconduct was the immediate precipitating cause
of the injury does not compel a conclusion that negligent supervision was not the proximate cause" of
the injury. Id. at ..... 585 P.2d at 858, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 8 (quoting Dailey v. Los Angeles Unified School
Dist., 2 Cal. 3d 741, 750, 470 P.2d 360, 365, 87 Cal. Rptr. 376, 381 (1970).
In Calandri v. lone Unified School Dist., 219 Cal. App. 2d 542, 33 Cal. Rptr. 333 (1963), plaintiff,
a 15-year old student, was injured at his home when he unintentionally fired a toy cannon he made in
metal shop class. Plaintiff charged the school district and his teacher with negligently failing to warn the
student of dangers associated with loading and firing the cannon. The court, in reversing the dismissal
of the complaint by the trial court, acknowledged the existence of a duty running from the school
to the student, even though the injury did not occur on the school's premises. Id. at . 33 Cal. Rptr. at
336-37.
'°71 N.J. Super. 573, 177 A.2d 595 (1962).
'o' Id. 'at ..... 177 A.2d at 596-97.
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exists whenever an injury occurs outside the school grounds and the plaintiff
attempts to link the injury to negligence occurring on the school grounds. This
does not mean, however, that a tort can never be proved.
Thus, that an injury occurs outside the classroom does not justify nonrecognition
of a duty and a cause of action if the injury resulted in part from improper classroom
instruction. If a student receives incorrect instruction in a woodshop class, establishes
his own woodshop after graduation, and is injured while operating a saw in the
manner in which he was taught, the student should be allowed a cause of action
against his teacher for breach of the duty to instruct properly. If a business teacher
instructs students on a typing keyboard that has not been used for fifty years, and
a student seeking a job after graduation is considered unqualified by prospective
employers because of the lack of knowledge of a modern keyboard, the student
should have a cause of action against the teacher or school administrators. The
causation is easy to establish in these extreme examples. Although causation will
not be as easy to prove in most instances, it cannot be said that as a matter of law,
a plaintiff who claims education deficiencies resulting from negligent instruction
will be unable to prove his case. Indeed, Hoffman is evidence that circumstances
can arise in which the school system's negligence can be proved to have caused the
student not to learn as much as he would have learned but for the negligence.
Another arguable distinction between supervision and instruction cases is that
the former typically involve physical injuries, while the latter involve mental injuries.
It is not necessary, however, to belabor the point that in appropriate cases tort law
does provide remedies for mental injuries. As noted earlier,10 5 courts have been
reluctant to recognize mental injury as an independent tort, but compensation for
mental injury associated with various torts is an established practice. The absence
of a physical injury does not necessarily mean that recovery should not be permitted
for a failure to instruct competently.
To recapitulate, the results reached in Peter W., Donohue, and Hoffman are
theoretically unsound because the courts' analyses of the failure to instruct com-
petently is not consistent with their analyses of the failure to supervise reasonably.
Although the supervisory function is largely indistinguishable from the teaching
function, courts recognize a duty to supervise reasonably, but not a duty to instruct
competently to prevent mental injury. Given the functional and legal coextensive-
ness of supervision and instruction, an analytical scheme that treats the two functions
differently will inevitably be unsound.
III. CONCLUSION
The theoretical inconsistencies inherent in the principle that no cause of action
exists for educational malpractice do not prove that the special policy objectives of
the principle are not meritorious. In other words, questioning the logic of the
courts' analyses is not equivalent to questioning the view that our educational
system is more viable if the cause of action is not recognized. Yet the inability of
courts to reconcile non-recognition of the cause of action with well-recognized tort
principles suggests that legislatures-and not courts-should make the ultimate
policy determination. A legislature, believing for public policy reasons that the cause
"o5 See text accompanying notes 79-90 supra.
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of action should not be recognized, could mandate this result by reviving a measure
of sovereign immunity or by prescribing exclusive administrative remedies.10
" In some jurisdictions, it would be possible to argue that the holding that no cause of action exists
for educational malpractice merely constitutes a judicial effort to revive previously abolished immunities.
Through the doctrine of sovereign immunity or the statutorily-based principle that public employees are
not liable for acts within their discretion, teachers and schools-as well as other government agencies and
employees-are arguably insulated from liability for torts. When sovereign immunity has been abrogated
or when the legislature has not devised an exclusive administrative remedy, it is fair to view the non-
recognition of a cause of action for educational malpractice as a judicial effort to restore previously
abrogated immunities or to impose immunities the legislature has not seen fit, through inaction, to
impose. The New York Court of Appeals in Dono/lthe and Hofiman stated that the administrative
processes provided by the New York Educational Law were exclusive remedies, even though nothing in
the statute suggests that the processes were intended to be exclusive remedies. Hoffman v. Board of
Educ., 49 N.Y.2d at 126-27, 400 N.E.2d at 319-20, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 379-80; Donahue v. Copiague Union
Free School Dist., 47 N.Y.2d at 445, 391 N.E.2d at 1354, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 378.
